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This paper argues that Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy attempts to reopen
the question of human transcendence in contemporary terms. While his concep-
tion of language as self-transcending is deeply Husserlian, Ricoeur also responds
to the analytical challenge when he deploys a basic distinction in Fregean logic in
order to clarify Heidegger’s phenomenology of world. Riceour’s commitment to a
transcendental view is evident in his conception of narrative, which enables him to
emphasize the role of the performative in literary reading. The meaning of the self
in time provides Ricoeur with a discursive basis for distinguishing his own position
from that of Kant and other philosophers in the transcendental tradition.
Paul Ricoeur’s conception of hermeneutics provides an essential key to his unique
approach to texts, which can be related to the event of the written word in con-
stituting “worlds” of meaning. This paper will investigate Ricoeur’s commitment
to hermeneutics as an enterprise that is transcendental in a way that is related to
the role of language in life and experience. The paper is composed of four parts.
We will first be concerned with Ricoeur’s phenomenological view of how the read-
ing of texts and the “structure” of events can shape our understanding of the self
in time. We shall then examine Ricoeur’s attempt to recast the phenomenological
conception of “world” through a revised notion of reference. This aspect of our ex-
position will demonstrate how Ricoeur reinterprets the work of Gottlob Frege in
maintaining that language is ultimately self-transcending just as it refers to an onto-
logical sphere that is capable of grounding linguistic insight. After examining how
the notion of the text is uniquely adopted by Ricoeur as a constitutive aspect of the
world-concept, we will discuss Ricoeur’s later shift to the problem of narrative in
order to clarify the relationship between the world of the reader and that of the text
in dynamic terms. The final part of our discussion considers the dual nature of the
self as suggested in Ricoeur’s understanding of human agency. By distinguishing an
identity that changes from mere self-sameness, Ricoeur demonstrates how human
beings alter their relationship to the world by constructing alternative discourses
through which they define themselves in time.
I
Ricoeur’s distinctive contribution as a philosopher is inseparable from his ability
to approach texts as sources of interpretive insight. Nonetheless, in approaching
some of the great texts in the Western intellectual tradition, Ricoeur does not merely
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interpret what he reads; in truth he resituates texts while exploring them in terms of
their broader significance. For Ricoeur, a text is not a self-contained literary object
that exists in a detached realm of timeless values. Beginning with Edmund Husserl
but moving beyond an eidetic phenomenology of essences, Ricoeur takes up the
challenge of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre in arguing that language impli-
cates human beings in a semantic adventure that is irreducible to a predetermined
outcome. The historical situation of the speaker is not simply a secondary feature
of lived experience. On the contrary, historical reality cannot be expunged from
linguistic utterances that “express” our engagement with the world. Moreover, lit-
erary texts go beyond the more limited perspectives that language opens up with
regard to external reality. Ricoeur’s phenomenological hermeneutics surpasses the
finitude of Dasein that Heidegger extols ontologically as well as the reflexive atti-
tudes that Sartre attributes to human consciousness. While deeply concerned with
the whole question of grounds, Ricoeur argues that our knowledge of the world is
largely mediated on the basis of “texts” that are not equivalent to a specific literary
subject-matter.
In taking up a hermeneutical approach to texts, Ricoeur also provides a new mode
of access to historical reality as a largely “linguistic” phenomenon. History is not
“verbal” in the sense of taking place in the space of utterances alone. Its special fea-
tures can be more strictly related to symbolic meaning on the level of what exceeds
the scope of a structural analysis. In dealing with a fundamental difference in the
way that symbols can be approached, Ricoeur points to an underlying divergence in
methodologies: “There are, then, two ways of accounting for symbolism: by means
of what constitutes it and by means of what it attempts to say.”1 Structural analy-
sis is concerned with what constitutes symbolic meaning on the level of phonemic
articulation. In contrast, symbolism can be approached in terms of what it attempts
to say on the level of expressive manifestation. In this case, expressivity should not
be identified with the subjective intentions of the speaker but instead pertains to
the manner in which language speaks about being. Hence symbolism allows us to
broach the problem of double meaning, which does not emerge unless the equivo-
cal nature of discourse can open up a world that lies beyond the closed universe of
linguistic signs.
Ricoeur’s resistance to structuralist closure performs an essential role in his con-
ception of how symbolic meaning involves a dialectical interplay between conscious
and unconscious experience. In Freud and Philosophy: An Essay On Interpretation
(De l’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud, 1965), Ricoeur readily admits that a
“hermeneutics of suspicion,” engaged primarily in the ideological project of un-
masking the disruptive truths that lie beneath the surface of things, should be
rigorously distinguished from a hermeneutics that traces the movement of the spirit
toward self-knowledge. In short, we should be willing to accept the opposition be-
tween Sigmund Freud and G. W. F. Hegel. However, this opposition is also false to
the degree that it forecloses the possibility of dialectical understanding. By the same
token, while exploring the twofold structure of symbolic awareness, Ricoeur returns
to classical Greek drama in The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics
(Le conflict des interpretations. Essais d’herméneutique, 1969) as a key to unlocking
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the temporal significance of textual meaning as the meeting-point for different but
related perspectives. On the one hand, Freud is adopted as the spokesman for a point
of view that would interpret Sophocles’s play, Oedipus Rex, as a metaphorical at-
tempt to recapitulate the destiny of humankind. From this standpoint, this timeless
play is less concerned with a conflict between destiny and freedom than with a rep-
etition in which we obscurely recognize our own repressed desires. However, more
explicitly than Jacques Derrida or Gilles Deleuze, Ricoeur conceives of repetition
in relation to narratives that enable the self to come to terms with inner possibilities
that are intrinsic to its own mode of being.
Thus, Ricoeur also observes that Sophocles’s drama can be read from the stand-
point of tragic realization, as opposed to a series of events that actually took place in
some exemplary manner. The play in this case would not be grounded in a belated
awareness of what happened but in an experience of truth that carries us into fu-
ture time: “It deals, not with Oedipus’s relation to the Sphinx, but with his relation
to the seer.”2 This second reading enables us to read the play as intertwined with
Oedipus at Colonus in which the protagonist assumes responsibilities for his own
guilt. Ricoeur contends that Teresias, rather than Oedipus, is the “center” of the play
to the degree that he alone represents “the power of truth,” which serves to unveil
the specific guilt of the Theban King. The ultimate meaning of the drama, however,
cannot be uncovered until Oedipus has internalized his past history, his unmeasured
response to the seer’s words and his self-punishment.
In discussing Oedipus Rex, Ricoeur is able to identify two aspects of textual
meaning that can be contrasted but also productively combined in a unified reading.
These two ways of approaching the text can be paired to two kinds of hermeneutics.
One type of hermeneutics is concerned primarily with the repetition of archaic sym-
bols that may have their home in unconscious motivations, which can become the
theme of psychoanalytic investigation. This type of hermeneutics accepts a static
form of repetition as its basic point of departure. However, the second kind of
hermeneutics is oriented toward the emergence of new symbols and figures that
ultimately result in a lasting experience of knowledge. Ricoeur contends that these
two approaches to the problem of meaning bring to light the dual nature of the sym-
bol. A symbol points back to a childhood that somehow evades the reality of time,
but it also points ahead to an adult life that teems with conflicts and responsibilities.3
The unity of the symbol permits us to move in either direction but it also provides a
basis for interaction between different points of view.
At the same time, Ricoeur in developing this model is also able to explain how
the opposition between conscious and unconscious mind can be overcome in a di-
alectical phenomenology. The worst methodology would be one that succumbed to
the dangers of eclecticism. It would be incoherent to merely “combine” Freud and
Hegel after having come to the conclusion that the materials of the unconscious
can be understood from a higher standpoint. However, in seeking to overcome a
purely abstract opposition, Ricoeur argues that the two sets of figures that constitute
symbolic understanding are actually one and the same.4 It is therefore possible to
envision a hermeneutics of consciousness as “the ability to retravel the figures of
the spirit.”5 Such a journey would be “phenomenological” in a manner that recalls
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Hegel but would not be controlled by a dialectical method that forecloses the mean-
ing of a possible existence. The role of the unconscious in this process would not
be opposed to consciousness but would function as the other to a more progressive
hermeneutic. In providing a hermeneutical basis for reading the story of Oedipus in
quasi-dialectical terms, Ricoeur demonstrates how interpretation itself can free the
mind from the limited perspectives of unconscious life.
I I
Ricoeur’s investment in hermeneutics was crucial to his increasing preoccupation
with the question of language, particularly as a linguistic phenomenon, as he be-
gan to explore the importance of texts to philosophical work. Unlike many of the
structuralists, who were also preoccupied with this same question, Ricoeur never
adopted the assumption that the scientific approach to language was adequate in and
of itself. While conceding that language possesses a structure and semiotic core, he
was not partial to the view that verbal utterances should be approached as unrelated
to truth claims about the world at large. In this regard, we might briefly examine the
basic argument of Ricoeur’s important work, The Rule of Metaphor (La métaphore
vive, 1975), in order to better understand how the task of interpretation came to as-
sume an increasingly transcendental significance in a series of linguistic inquiries
that focus on the production of verbal meaning. It has long been acknowledged that,
as both mathematician and philosopher of meaning, Gottlob Frege was important
to Husserl’s initial efforts to surpass the intellectual limitations of psychologism.
While this encounter certainly provides a partial explanation for why Husserl came
to revise a strongly genetic account of arithmetical cognition, we might contend that
this early exchange testifies more to the importance of the transcendental motif to
both Frege and Husserl, instead of arguing that Husserl was enlightened by Frege
in a manner that drew him closer to a purely referential or perhaps even empirical
theory of symbolic meaning.6
Hence, in attempting to ground verbal utterances along Fregean lines, Ricoeur
proceeds as a phenomenologist who works in the transcendental tradition by adopt-
ing a concern for what provides immediate experience with a framework within
which meaning can be grasped as a whole. The fact that Ricoeur is concerned with
verbal rather than mathematical meaning certainly does not annul the transcendental
nature of his approach, nor does it necessarily imply that what is being said about
words has nothing to do with physical existence. However, the question of what
exactly defines “transcendence” in Ricoeur’s inquiry into the role of metaphor in
verbal expression cannot be resolved long strictly Kantian lines. The distinction be-
tween semiotics and semantics, as well as the inadequacies of strictly Saussurean
accounts of linguistic functioning, support the notion that a phenomenological un-
derstanding of the complete sentence, rather than the individual word, allows the
speaker to transcend the immanence of language in assertions of reference. Hence,
in arguing that language provides us with a basis for transcendence, Ricoeur as a
phenomenologist does not presume that the “object” that is verbally projected is
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equivalent to the Kantian thing-in-itself, nor does he maintain that the meanings
intended through any sentence are fundamentally unknowable. On the contrary,
while the object that is verbally intended transcends the immanence of language
in a way that exceeds the sphere of both signifier and signified, this same object
could be located in a “world” that is ontologically constituted.
The phenomenological model that Ricoeur adopts in his account of language
therefore includes both Frege and Husserl, just as it implies a view of reference
that remains linked to intentions but cannot be reduced to the deliberations of a
self-contained human subject. Ricoeur readily concedes that “there is no reference
problem in language” to the degree that linguistic signs always refer to other signs in
constituting verbal statements as systemic unities. However, the signifying intention
that animates any sentence escapes the closure of the sign in constituting language
as a saying that is about something: “In the phenomenon of the sentence, language
passes outside itself; reference is the mark of the self-transcendence of language.”7
Émile Benveniste provides Ricoeur with a rigorous basis for relating the semantics
of the sentence to the world of the speaker and the situation to which the speaker
belongs. Moreover, in focusing on the semantic aspects of language use, rather than
on the purely semiotic features of linguistic constructs, Ricoeur can explain how the
transcendence-function that is implied by the Husserlian concept of the intended can
be understood as a deepening of Frege’s notion of reference. Thus, while contend-
ing that the moment of transcendence in ordinary language use has its “linguistic”
home in the complete sentence, Ricoeur also returns to Husserl in reminding us that
“language is intentional par excellence; it aims beyond itself.”8
Ricoeur’s insight into the value of the sentence as the primary mode of connecting
the speaker to the world underlies his detailed study of metaphor, which takes issue
with both the structuralist neglect of subjective intentions and the poststructural-
ist indifference to questions of verbal meaning. While structuralism posits the sign
as the basic unit of linguistic inquiry, Ricoeur argues that the generation of mean-
ing cannot be understood unless the complete sentence is approached as a semantic
event that occurs in human time. In going beyond poststructuralism as well, he also
contends that semantics can be identified with a creative definition which contests a
basically semiotic interpretation of the linguistic sign. Ricoeur emphasizes the tem-
poral character of the verbal utterance in order to retain the possibility of recovering
intentionality, without, however, restricting linguistic meaning to the notion of an
“origin” that remains either pure or inaccessible. His unique position allows him to
assert the difference between speculative and poetic thinking, but it also prevents
him from reducing verbal tropes to symbolic gestures that allude to the invisible at
the expense of concrete experience.
It is therefore necessary to place Ricoeur’s approach to language in a broader
philosophical context before his specific contributions to metaphor theory can be
seriously appraised. Phenomenology provides him with a basic tool for exploring
how language alters our relationship to the world on the level of both perception
and cognition. Metaphor in the phenomenological tradition is irreducible to a se-
ries of logical operations that might resolve a contradiction in relation to conceptual
schemata. The re-adjustments that metaphor prompts are brought about through a
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moment of insight that allows a new structure to emerge in place of a prior concep-
tual arrangement. Ricoeur discusses how thinking through metaphor involves what
Gilbert Ryle calls a “category mistake” that replaces one system of classification
with another more appropriate one.9 This movement toward readjustment, how-
ever, is not merely semiotic but semantic in its motivation and outcome. Moreover,
Ricoeur identifies a non-verbal element in metaphorical thinking that can be under-
stood in terms of Kant’s notion of the productive imagination: “Treated as a schema,
the image presents a verbal dimension; before being the gathering-point of faded im-
pressions, it is that of emerging meanings.”10 Metaphor makes visible in discourse
an interplay between identity and difference, which registers the bringing together
of image and conceptual schemes.11
In defending the value of resemblance to the life of metaphor, Ricoeur begins to
suggest how figurative language functions in a concrete manner, rather than as the
servant of an invisible order. The way that metaphor can bring us into contact with
reality informs his defense of reference in opposition to a tendency prominent in
mid-century Anglo-American criticism to treat the literary work as a self-contained
verbal icon. The writer who suspends descriptive reference in constructing po-
etic texts is also engaged in projecting a “world” of indeterminate meaning: “The
metaphor of a concrete object – the poem itself – cuts language off from the didactic
function of the sign, but at the same time opens up access to reality in the mode of
fiction and feeling.”12 When defined in this manner, however, “reality” as a form of
reference should not be identified with scientific denotation. The hermeneutics of
double reference that applies to works of art can be applied as well to the analysis of
metaphorical statements. At the same time, Ricoeur’s attention to what lies on the
other side of verbal constructs can be assigned an ontological meaning that does not
deprive symbolic language of its perceptual immediacy.
The reformulation of reference along ontological lines also suggests the influ-
ence of Heidegger on Ricoeur’s existential hermeneutics. Frege’s classic distinction
between “sense” (Sinn) and “reference” (Bedeutung) is not only important to the
way that language surpasses itself and grounds our relationship to the world, but
it can provide the basis as well for an ontology of the work of art: “The struc-
ture of the work is in fact its sense and the world of the work is its reference.”13
This claim, however, would be misunderstood if it were to be interpreted as an at-
tempt to ground artistic contexts in a narrowly objective relation to the world. The
term “world” in this case builds on Heidegger’s phenomenological explorations in
Sein und Zeit, where the situation of Dasein is contrasted to that of the Cartesian
subject.14 In adapting Frege to a cultural subject-matter, Ricoeur undoes the re-
striction of reference to statements that have only scientific validity. Moreover, his
employment of the world-concept in contrast to structure allows us to glimpse a
quasi-transcendental aspect in what the work of art projects as its existential hori-
zon. Unlike the first-order references that define scientific statements, the horizon to
which the work of art refers constitutes a possible world. However, this world com-
pares in its interpretive powers to what verbal metaphors can provide in the way of
insight and knowledge. The “ideal” nature of this world does not argue against its
moral or cognitive value.
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While drawing on Heidegger in developing the world-concept as a form of ref-
erence, Ricoeur also departs from his philosophical predecessor when opposing
language to writing as a key to worldhood. Verbal conversations communicate to
those who listen, but written discourse no longer coincides in its current meaning
to what the author originally intended. Particularly in his late work, Heidegger em-
phasized the role of language in constituting the world that human beings inhabit
in time. Ricoeur, however, offers a more substantial role to forms of expression that
go beyond the intentions of individual speakers in constituting the world as such.
In a short but highly compact discussion of modern hermeneutics that is presented
in Interpretation Theory, Ricoeur contrasts the special role of writing to what nor-
mally occurs in verbal dialogue: “Thanks to writing, man and only man has a world
and not just a situation.”15 Writing has “spiritual implications” that emerge when
material marks are substituted for oral discourse. While denying that speech as such
can constitute a world, Ricoeur emphasizes the public aspect of writing and thus
foregrounds the complex process through which meaning is socially negotiated.
Hence, to the degree that it can be interpreted and reinterpreted, writing frees us
from the limitations of situational encounters that limit us to the relatively unam-
biguous utterances that constitute personal expression. In a brief aside that echoes
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s notion of the classical, Ricoeur reminds us of how vari-
ous texts allow us to speak of a Greek “world” that does not correspond in its
deeper meanings to what is historically past.16 The specifically literary meaning
of Ricoeur’s phenomenology of world is evident in his appreciation of texts as
historically mediated documents that acquire meaning only through a series of in-
terpretations. The world of the reader is a social one to the degree that texts depend
on communities in order to be interpreted. On the most basic level, writing and
reading must be distinguished from verbal dialogue. Whatever comes down to us
from the past has been mediated in a way that cannot conceal a basic discrepancy
between an original situation and meanings that have been read into it. Moreover,
this irreducible difference foregrounds the emergence of an underlying discontinu-
ity: “The reader is absent from the act of writing; the writer is absent from the act
of reading.”17
Ricoeur, nonetheless, interprets the separation of the written word from autho-
rial intentions as the precondition for textual interpretation. Interpretation becomes
textual when the text becomes subject to further interpretations, that is, when an in-
terpretant mediates between the sign and the object to which the sign refers. Ricoeur
invokes this Peircean term and distinction in discussing how texts are interpreted
according to the traditions of an entire community that assumes a dynamic relation
to future time. Once again, in discussing the story of Oedipus, Ricoeur provides
an interpretive model that goes beyond structuralism in suggesting how the whole
narrative of origins can shape our response to what would otherwise be assigned a
purely analytic meaning. From this standpoint, the story of Oedipus becomes a myth
that is oriented “toward limit situations, toward the origin and the end, toward death,
suffering, and sexuality.”18 The Oedipus myth is therefore more than the symbolic
enactment of a peculiar fate but constitutes a sign that differently engages us as we
interpret the outcome of both error and self-knowledge.
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In clarifying Ricoeur’s argument that language surpasses itself in a moment of self-
transcendence, and then in discussing further how the concept of world can serve
ontologically as a grounding principle that includes references but is not restricted
in its scope to a delimited set of meanings, we have come to a moment in our ex-
position when the theme of temporality must be taken up as a challenge to what
might otherwise be identified with a static view of human knowledge. Ricoeur’s
modification of Heidegger’s view of world to evoke texts, rather than purely verbal
encounters, begs the question of how readers are implicated in consensual situations
that define them existentially and also how the experience of truth is temporally
situated. Ricoeur’s interest in narrative was a logical outcome of his recognition
that the link between language and world cannot be fully considered apart from
the question of temporality. Moreover, while the phenomenological tradition offers
rich if somewhat conflicting accounts of how temporality structures life experience,
Ricoeur demonstrates through his reading of well-known sources how both Husserl
and Heidegger strain the limits of phenomenology in setting forth dissimilar con-
ceptions of time that prepare us for the “narrative turn” that his own work strongly
exemplifies. Furthermore, after presenting us with a critical overview of this tradi-
tion in Time and Narrative 3 (Temps et Récit 3. Le temps raconté, 1985), Ricoeur
then proceeds to discuss how the literary reader provides us with a unique perspec-
tive on a peculiar world that differs from that of the text and, in this way, places a
limit on the “fusion of horizons” that ideally occurs between text and reader. Finally,
the importance of the narrator to the formation of narrative provides Ricoeur with
an ontological basis for distinguishing personal identity from the identity of things,
when conceived merely in terms of unchanging self-sameness.
Ricoeur’s critical assessment of Husserl’s work demonstrates that phenomenol-
ogy arrived at the threshold of a hermeneutical approach to the problem of time,
just as it provided a profoundly original basis for thinking about temporal experi-
ence. Ricoeur contends that in his analysis of a single tone that figures prominently
in the lecture series, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, Husserl
provides a basis for conceiving of duration as something other than the point-
like instant that would prevent us from grasping the role of “before” and “after”
in a single continuum.19 While implying that Husserl is already the precursor to
a hermeneutical approach to time, Ricoeur also criticizes him for failing to rec-
ognize “the irreducibly metaphorical character of the most important terms upon
which his description is based,” so that the resources of ordinary language that only
begin to emerge in the phenomenological account might have been more fully ex-
plored, if only they had been noticed.20 However, there can be no doubt that Husserl
achieves a great advance in demonstrating how the gaze converts the instant from a
source-point into a limit, and in this way provides a basis for thinking the present
as inseparable from the past: “The instant, considered apart from its power to begin
a retentional series, is merely the result of abstracting from the continuity of this
process.”21 Husserl’s second major advance in this context is to explain how the
past can be retained in memory as if it were a source-point, that is to say, as the
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re-production of an earlier moment that is “produced” in time. “The result is that
any moment in a series of present instants can be represented in the imagination as a
source-point in the mode of ‘as if’.”22 What this means is that a simple melody, for
instance, can be retained in a quasi-present that becomes the center of its own set
of retentions and pretensions, and thus repeats a first hearing in its own time. The
phenomenological structure of this quasi-present allows Ricoeur to discuss how the
past can be maintained in historical consciousness, which enables us to remember
and interpret what has already occurred.
However, Ricoeur’s strongly positive overview of Husserl’s contribution to the
problem of time does not prevent him from turning to Heidegger for a very different
account that also casts light on the traditions of phenomenology. In the former dis-
cussion, Ricoeur acknowledges that Husserl seems to run up against a certain limit
when the question of expectation emerges as a counter to the system of protentions
and retentions that constitutes temporal consciousness. Hence, expectation becomes
an “event” that apparently exceeds the framework that defines phenomenology as a
rigorous discipline: “It cannot be the counterpart of memory, which ‘reproduces’ a
present experience, both intentional and retentional.”23 Ricoeur indicates that the
role of language in Sein und Zeit offers the key to what is most original in that
document, particularly as an attempt to surpass previous approaches to temporality.
However, this special alternative to Husserlian method also encounters two basic
difficulties when it comes to define itself as hermeneutical ontology. Ricoeur first
contends that Heidegger’s conception of being-as-a-whole strictly depends on the
distinction between authentic and inauthentic modes of being, which his own ap-
proach only permits us to affirm as a secondary phenomenon. While Heidegger
seems well-equipped to include expectation in a conception of time that is open
to the future as a privileged sphere of understanding, Ricoeur emphasizes that
hermeneutical ontology is no less obligated to accept the present as a basic locus
of concern: “As for the present, far from engendering the past and the future by
multiplying itself, as in Augustine, it is the mode of temporality possessing the
most deeply concealed authenticity.”24 Furthermore, Heidegger’s indebtedness to
phenomenology cannot conceal the gap between an internalized sense of time and
a cosmological sense that becomes evident in the discourse on traces, marks and
memorials that runs through his philosophical text, almost to the point of rupturing
its precarious unity.
In confronting this second difficulty, Ricoeur is able to develop an argument in fa-
vor of a “third path” that would build upon previous advances and insights but would
go beyond the aporias that encumbered all previous phenomenologies of time. In
short, Ricoeur’s reading of Heidegger enables him to identify hermeneutical ontol-
ogy with a certain crisis and also to explain how this crisis might be resolved in a
manner that opens up a new, and previously overlooked, philosophical option. On
the one hand, Heidegger’s notion of primordial temporality can be related to the
possibility of a more authentic mode of being and requires a decisive confrontation
with the ordinary conception of time that allegedly dominates everyday life. What
this means, however, is that two conceptions of time are placed next to one another
in an analysis of Dasein that does not initially privilege authentic over inauthentic
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modes of existence. Ricoeur calls attention to the fact that Sein und Zeit integrates
a hermeneutics of the trace that is hard to dissociate from a cosmological sense of
time, which has a quasi-public significance just as it testifies to the enduring power
of ordinary time in all spheres of human measurement.
It might be assumed that Heidegger should be able isolate the phenomenological
conception of time through the exposition of the three ek-stases, and to preserve this
conception as relatively uncontaminated when compared to what dominates every-
day life experience. However, Ricoeur not only questions that this state of separation
can be maintained but argues that the opposition between the two kinds of time is
only intensified when Heidegger tries to displace “ordinary time” in his elevation
of primordial time over inauthentic existence. Ricoeur often seems to contend that
the concept of ordinary time is almost impossible to sustain to the degree that the
single instant cannot be considered on its own, whereas original temporality always
runs the risk of being contaminated.25 Ricoeur significantly acknowledges the role
of language in this act of displacement, which requires that we recognize “the fun-
damental distinction between an anonymous instant and a present defined by the
instant of discourse that designates the present reflexively.”26 Nonetheless, what
turns out to be decisive is the way that cosmological time, particularly as registered
in scientific chronologies, continually threatens to interrupt the continuity of lived
time, considered in phenomenological terms.
Having broached the question of language, Ricoeur then contends that
Heidegger’s inability to reconcile these dissimilar conceptions of time is precisely
what prevents him from taking up the problem of history as a special concern that
offers the most credible basis for moving beyond a basic opposition within which
Sein und Zeit unfolds. For Ricoeur, however, history is not reducible to either the
subjective deliberations of a free subject or to the commemorative signs that tes-
tify to public order. In discussing the notion of the trace as it begins to emerge as
a physical sign in a hermeneutical ontology, Ricoeur prepares us for the idea that
history itself is not primarily a totality but more crucially a series of events that can-
not be assimilated to a systemic whole. Just as the physical trace of another being
can disrupt the settled topology of a country path, the traces of history are some-
how “other” to whatever seems to be predetermined from a cognitive standpoint.
Ricoeur pays homage to Emmanuel Lévinas in acknowledging that the trace must
be opposed to what is radically self-contained and therefore constitutes an evasion
of difference, dialogically conceived. Instead of expressing this difference in ulti-
mately theological terms, however, Ricoeur predicates the existence of “a relative
Other, a historical Other,” in terms of which “the remembered past is meaningful
on the basis of an immemorial past.”27 It remains to be considered how this relative
other can produce a rift in a larger totality and prepare the entry of the historical into
what otherwise would emerge as a mere break in the order of appearances.
We should not be surprised to discover that Ricoeur, at this point in his argument,
should have recourse to the example of literature as a special discourse that clarifies
the concept of “world” in terms of ideal meanings. The rift that is produced by the
trace of writing constitutes the condition for the possibility of narrative itself, which
cannot be encountered in the sphere of pure nature. Literature is not co-extensive
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with narrative but celebrates the human capacity to invent temporal sequences that
are imaginatively re-enacted whenever the reader approaches the text as a transfor-
mative occasion. Ricoeur describes the world-concept as an “event” that cannot be
grasped mentally apart from the sense of time: “Each fictive temporal experience
unfolds its world, and each of these worlds is singular, incomparable, unique.”28
Moreover, in recounting how Wolgang Iser adapts the phenomenology of Roman
Ingarden in formalizing the act of reading as a “wandering viewpoint,” Ricoeur in-
troduces perpetual instability into the heart of textual experience, without, however,
undermining the difference between the world of the text and that of the reader.29
The opposition between both worlds returns us to the ontological version of Frege’s
concept of reference that Ricoeur presented earlier in his theory of metaphor.
Nevertheless, before more clearly stating how reference is rearticulated in this
later, more hermeneutical context, we might consider for a moment how the world
of the text and that of the reader approximate one another while remaining different.
The ultimate horizon for considering the quasi-dialectical link between these two
worlds is existential rather than literary in the narrow sense. While the world of the
text is an ideal one that neutralizes the reader’s relationship to practical life, reading
provides only a temporary position within the fictive world that allows us to detach
ourselves from the immediate concerns of everyday life: “Reading then becomes
a place, itself unreal, where reflection takes pause.”30 In contrast to this scene of
neutralization, whenever readers allow an original relationship to the world to be
transformed through the act of reading, they themselves acquire a heightened sense
of the real at the precise moment that reading becomes “something other than a place
where they come to rest; it is a medium they cross through.”31 What this model of
reading clearly provides is a framework for differentiating the world of the reader
and that of the text so that the two worlds can be placed in relation to one another,
rather than merged in a single identity. The crucial term here is temporal experience,
since the opposition between the two worlds is only overcome when the life of the
reader is animated with intentions that are analogous to those that the narrator has
inscribed in the literary text.
In positing the co-existence of the world of the text and that of the reader, Ricoeur
provides a more phenomenologically based conception of Gadamer’s “fusion of
horizons,” which can be interpreted as a mediatory principle as well as a con-
tribution to the hermeneutical critique of Absolute Idealism.32 It is important to
understand that the notion of a fusion between past and present does not occur with-
out a remainder. On the contrary, Ricoeur no less than Gadamer contends that the
past as revealed in any historical horizon can be thought as different from the present
at the very moment that it is fused with it: “This idea of a temporal horizon as some-
thing that is both projected and separate, distinguished and included, brings about
the dialecticizing of the idea of traditionality.”33 Tradition as the meeting-point be-
tween past and present is not to be understood as a mere “handing down” but an as
appropriation that allows the past to work through the present. What is dialectical
in this movement should not be confused with dialectics in the narrowly Platonic or
modern Hegelian sense: hermeneutics is not based on a pre-ordained system of gra-
dations that the subject must surmount as it ascends to a higher sphere of knowledge.
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Tradition is conceived hermeneutically as a scene of language in which the expe-
rience of plurality comes before the question of truth. The nature of transmission
from past to present does not allow us to position ourselves as the absolute origin of
what we inherit. Tradition now has the significance of referring to many traditions
to the degree that language itself opens up the possibility of both interpretation and
reinterpretation: “For language is the great institution, the institution of institutions,
that has preceded each and every one of us.”34
The plurality of traditions suggests that our role as individuals in any conceivable
narrative is strictly limited, just as it helps demonstrate that the meaning of narrative
cannot be limited to the reading of literature. The question remains as to the identity
of the narrator in any case, since the question of how narratives are constructed
can only be asked if the possibility of free improvisation is in some sense available
to us. The identity of the narrator, therefore, must be founded on the possibility
that human beings can change in a manner that does not preclude constancy in
time. While David Hume’s refutation of substance allowed him to argue against the
reality of the self as a unified entity, Ricoeur distinguishes the identity of the same
(idem) from the identity of the self-same (ipse) in order to counter the view that this
reality is no more than a substantialist illusion. Moreover, this crucial distinction
allows us to articulate the identity of the narrator as ontologically distinct rather
than as abstract and unclarified: “The difference between idem and ipse is nothing
more than a difference between a substantial or formal and narrative identity.”35 The
identity of the narrator helps us understand how the gap between the world of the
text and that of the reader can be reduced, if not overcome, since narratives are part
of ordinary life experience as well as an essential aspect of literature.
I V
Ricoeur’s approach to the meaning of narrative has taken us to the threshold of an
issue that is central to the hermeneutical account of identity as it emerges in an on-
tological sense. We have learned how, in the phenomenological tradition, language
involves self-transcendence and also that the concept of world can be interpreted as a
transcendental one insofar as it involves more than an empirical familiarity with con-
crete objects. The need to move from the reading experience back to an experience
of the life-world motivated us to inquire into the nature of tradition as a realm where
interpretation engages “linguistic” understanding in an on-going process that both
confirms the difference between past and present and also mediates between them.
When tradition emerges in the form of many traditions, we become more aware of
how the meaning of the past can be renegotiated, rather than simply presented to us
as a settled body of interpretations that must be uncritically accepted. Particularly in
such cases, the actual identity of the narrator might become a cause of dispute to the
degree that intentions cease to be transparent in written documents that are subject
to multiple interpretations, thus generating an “effective-history” that should not be
confused with originally intended meanings. This situation of hermeneutical insta-
bility might seem to foreclose the possibility of ontological grounding. However, in
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inquiring into the identity of the narrator, Ricoeur returns to the issue of grounds in
broaching the question of “who” speaks in any narrative that concerns the mediation
of past and present.
While Ricoeur’s conception of the narrator presupposes the distinction between
two forms of identity, we need to focus more strictly on the phenomenology of the
self in order to determine how this distinction operates on the level of human action.
In Oneself as Another (Soi-même comme un autre, 1990), Ricoeur discusses how
analytical approaches to narrative might be critically assessed and then related to a
hermeneutics that is indebted to Aristotle and Kant as well as to phenomenology.
After providing an overview of how the Aristotelian tradition attempts to link action
and agency on a practical basis, Ricoeur exposes the basically aporetic structure
of this nexus in the modern debate on ascription and attribution, and then goes on
to propose an alternative that evokes Kantian principles but also goes far beyond
them. This alternative is “dialectical” in the broad sense and consists of two stages.
The first stage is “disjunctive” and can be clarified in terms of Kant’s distinction
between the causality of nature and that of freedom. Kant specifies that the appear-
ances of the world do not entirely derive from empirical reality but suggest how
a departure from the order of nature occurs whenever free acts spring into being:
“To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another
causality, that of freedom”.36 Ricoeur contends that versions of this dichotomous
phase can be found in the analytical tradition when G. E. M. Anscombe, Donald
Davidson and Arthur Danto present conceptions of agency that cannot be traced
back to naturalistic assumptions concerning how human events begin.
In following through on Kant’s argument, Ricoeur does not contend that human
actions involve an “absolute” beginning but that they begin as “relatively first,”
which means that they entail the partial interruption of a continuum without, how-
ever, breaking with the order of nature itself. It is true that, from the standpoint
of empirical causality, human actions involve a spontaneous attempt to introduce a
new series of appearances that does not derive from nature. Nevertheless, Ricoeur
reminds us that Kant basically operates in the privative mode when he gives us the
example of a man rising from his chair in a single moment in order to explain how
our actions are not reducible to the course of nature. Thus, it is only “in respect
of causality though not in time” that human actions can be said to be absolutely
free.37 As long as the perspective of time is firmly held in place, human actions
only admit of having relative independence and the broader context within which
they unfold must be taken into account whenever we attempt to understand their
mundane significance. Ricoeur introduces the perspective of finitude at the precise
moment that human actions acquire a relative meaning that refutes the radical origi-
nality of whatever we succeed in doing: “The distinction between a beginning of the
world and a beginning in the world is essential to the notion of a practical beginning
taken from the point of view of its function of completeness”.38 The perspective of
human finitude is opposed to that of an absolute beginning and therefore functions
as the antithesis in a basic antinomy. Once the stated opposition is presented in a
way that qualifies the reach of each term, we can maintain that the thesis and the
antithesis are true on different levels without being contradictory.
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However, the “conjunctive” phase of Ricoeur’s analysis demonstrates how the
rather conventional dichotomy between Kant and Aristotle, or deontology and tele-
ology in matters of ethical experience, is difficult to sustain to the degree that a
movement back into the broader context of life necessarily follows this earlier, more
detached phase. Kant helps us understand how the practical concept of freedom is
founded on transcendental freedom, which in the sensible world is the cause of ap-
pearances and can be regarded from two points of view: “Regarded as the causality
of a thing in itself, it is intelligible in its action; regarded as the causality of an ap-
pearance in the world of sense, it is sensible in its effects”.39 Kant’s notion of an
intelligible character brings together both types of causality in a practical field that
Ricoeur identifies with the term initiative, which is conceived as the unity of the
phenomenon in the field of acting: “Initiative, we shall say, is an intervention of the
agent which effectively causes changes in the world”.40 Initiative is already implicit,
if not explicit, in Aristotle’s conception of how an agent becomes the contributing
cause to the forming of disposition and character. It would seem, therefore, that the
return to a more classical notion of causality might be combined hermeneutically
with the Kantian notion of bi-causal intervention, which links internal and external
causality in a single constellation.
It might be objected that hermeneutics has traditionally opposed explanation and
understanding in a manner that would relegate external causality to the sphere of
scientific cognition in contrast to the inner sphere of pure knowing. Ricoeur, how-
ever, develops the hermeneutical aspects of initiative as the confluence of two types
of causality in revisiting Georg Von Wright’s model of causal intervention in the op-
eration of dynamic systems. Instead of envisioning intervention as an external affair,
Von Wright proposes that we interpret the moment of contact that alters the flow of
a given system as the outcome of a practical engagement, rather than as the result
of a purely conscious deliberation. In such a situation, two types of causality are at
work, but the interweaving of system and teleology during the moment of interven-
tion cannot overcome a basic separation as long as we remain within the limits of
a certain discourse. Ricoeur nonetheless contends that in order to express the pos-
sibility of this active confluence, we have to resort to “a type of discourse different
from the one we employ here,” so that an affirmation of human agency can be com-
bined with a bodily sense that informs the act of volition in each and every case.41
This very different discourse would have its basis in the preontological apprehen-
sion of being that informs our practical comportment in the world: “The passage
from the disjunctive to the conjunctive phase of the dialectic has no aim other than
to carry out on a reflective and critical level what was already recomprehended in
this assurance of being able to do something”.42
Ricoeur’s hermeneutical recasting of the Kantian problematic can be related on a
fundamental level to the theory of narrative that enabled him to develop an original
approach to the phenomenology of time. Ricoeur uses the term “discordant con-
cordance” in attempting to capture the contradictory aspects of narrative, which are
present whenever a story is devised to synthesize a heterogeneous subject-matter.
The role of the plot in literary works clearly illuminates a contradictory situation:
“It is a source of discordance inasmuch as it springs up, and a source of concordance
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inasmuch as it allows the story to advance.”43 Narrative demonstrates how certain
contradictions can be resolved in a manner that recalls Kant’s method for resolv-
ing the third antinomy, which addresses the thesis that an event can begin in time
and an equally plausible antithesis that an event can have infinite duration. Works
of literature most clearly show us how a certain character can initiate a series of
actions that are personally definitive, just as the plot structures the literary work ac-
cording to beginning, middle and end in a manner that is entirely consistent with the
emergence of free initiatives: “By making the initiative belonging to the character
to coincide in this way with the beginning of the action, narrative satisfies the thesis
without violating the antithesis”.44 Of course, the function of initiative in the actions
of characters is not something that we discover in literary works alone; on the con-
trary, the conjunctive aspect of our quasi-dialectic should remind us that initiatives
are already part of life before they are embedded in narratives that assume the form
of writing.
We still need to determine whether or not the agent who is capable of taking
specific initiatives might be capable as well of acting in relation to others, perhaps
even in concert with others in the space of a shared world. Ricoeur approaches
this problem from two different standpoints in suggesting how ethics must integrate
mutuality and reciprocity in achieving validity.45 Aristotle and Lévinas provide us
with partial insights into what constitutes an ethical life, since the classical con-
ception of friendship and the religious idea of justice contribute in different ways
to a balanced understanding of human agency. On the one hand, Ricoeur derives
from Aristotle the idea of an ethics of reciprocity which, through the example of
friendship, offers a positive conception of living together. Friendship places us on
the path of justice insofar as it entails reciprocity, which is linked to the achieve-
ment of equality that must be present whenever human beings form a plurality
in any historical and political setting. From Lévinas, Ricoeur adopts a concern
for goodness that is perhaps more implicit than explicit in the religious perspec-
tive that is introduced when an asymmetrical relationship between Self and Other
opens up the possibility of a “summoning to responsibility” that constitutes the
meaning of ethics itself. The singular being who hears and receives a divine in-
junction would not be capable of responding to the call if it did not presuppose
a dialectic of give and take in a face-to-face encounter. If the agent’s “capacity
for giving in return were not freed by the other’s very initiative,” the injunction
would fail to inspire responsible action.46 Ricoeur argues in this same context
that the agent must be able to draw upon an available “resource of goodness”
in order to respond in a positive manner to an injunction that comes from the
outside.
In confronting the social implications of an ethics of responsibility, Ricoeur
demonstrates how self-transcendence occurs through a process that involves lan-
guage in a complex movement that engages the other person. Aristotle’s notion
of mutuality already contained elements of substitutability, reversibility and simil-
itude that constitute the heart of this process, but the importance of discourse to
this three-fold unity cannot be underestimated. Ricoeur contends that the basis for
this discursive unity lies in the sphere of practical activity, rather than in the realm
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of pure thought, and that the encounter with the other person that it entails is not
incidental to a process that might be considered on its own:
What language teaches, precisely as practice, is verified by all practices. The agents and patients of an
action are caught up in relationships of exchange which, like language, join together the reversibility of
roles and the nonsubstitutability of persons. Solicitude adds the dimension of value, whereby each person
is irreplaceable in our affection and our esteem. In this respect, it is in experiencing the irreparable loss of
the loved other that we learn, through the transfer of the other onto ourselves, the irreplaceable character
of our own life. It is first for the other that I am irreplaceable.47
Mortality thus becomes a source of solicitude when my own self-esteem is expe-
rienced as similar to my feeling towards the other. A paradox arises when I consider
how an exchange is possible at the place where the other becomes irreplaceable.
What seems to be problematic from a certain standpoint, however, becomes less
so when I consider how my ability to take initiatives and value my own deeds can
be extended to the other by way of comparison. The analogical nature of the re-
lationship between self and other thus produces a keen sense of reciprocity. This
peculiar equivalency entails the mutual esteem of self and other that preserves
alterity without undermining the possibility of relative accord.
Finally, we might wonder if this analogical relationship between self and other
is simply established on principle or on the basis of some internal mechanism that
operates in separate regions, which could be bridged only on an occasional basis. In
dealing with this problem, Ricoeur refers us to Greek tragedy in order to underscore
the role of feeling in solicitude. Tragedy instructs us by demonstrating that the pain
of others can be shared, and it achieves this most effectively when it reminds us that
the friend’s weakness can offer us something that is greatly in excess of our own
reserves of strength. What Aristotle evoked in using the term “disposition” applies
to feelings when interpreted as affects, which merge with the specific motivations
that give life its depth and wholeness. It is through feelings, rather than on the basis
of an abstract sense of duty per se, that the relationship between self and other
acquires a spontaneous quality that allows for genuine solicitude: “For it is indeed
feelings that are revealed in the self by the other’s suffering, as well by the moral
injunction coming from the other, feelings spontaneously directed toward others.”48
The tragic poets who provide us with spectacles of human suffering do not simply
chronicle a vanished past; on the contrary, they invite us to witness aspects of our
own lives in the actions of characters and in the broader forces that shape the human
world, both near and far.
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